Informational Transfer

Another good example that where the agents need to emit signals of credibility is the case of producers of new goods. The necessity exists to induce the consumers to try the new product. Low prices initial, or raised expenses of propaganda in the launching of the product are methods generally used to introduce new merchandises in consolidated markets already. Another instrument is offers of guarantee for long periods, what it only can be disponibilizado by quality products, contrary case would represent heavy costs for the producing firm. In the case of used automobiles, where the salesman of the car of good quality can signal for the purchaser, giving to it a guarantee of devolution of the payment, plus a preset parcel, case the car will be a lemon. The same guarantee cannot be given by the salesman of a lemon, for obvious reasons.

Initially the theory of the signalling was introduced by Spence (1974), applying it the work market. Its study if it relates to the one quality signal, that it is the level of education of the worker, whose acquisition necessarily is atrelada to a cost not only monetary, but also physicist as the time excused in lessons and readings. The same analogy can be applied for the politics of payment of shares for shareholders in a company. The shares mean a cost for the company, therefore it is taking off money of its box and delivered its shareholders. However, an incentive for this type of positioning exists, since the payment of high shares signals to the market that the company in question is lucrative enjoying of good financial condition. In such a way, such companies are apt to catch less onerous resources the measure that more people would desire to apply its economies in it.

In the same way, companies who are in me the financial situation will not be able to pay shares, in view of that, probably, they are with box difficulties and this would imply in the company in addition. Soon, the costs would be greaters that the benefits. Therefore, they will only go to pay shares, the companies who to possess good projects of investments. In the case of the credit market, analysts of companies search to identify signals of that the petitioner to the loan presents good terms of payment. One of the signals most obvious is the countable demonstratives of the company that will present its current financial condition, confirming its capacity to liquidate its obligations. Therefore, whenever it will be possible, the signalling is an important source of information, reducing therefore the problem of adverse election between the agents. Bibliography: COCONUT, Giuseppe. On the Use of Collateral. Journal of Economic Surveys. v. 14, n 2, 2000, P. 191-214. KIRMANI, Amna and RAO, Akshay. In the Pain, the Gain: The Critical Review of the Literature on Signalling Unobservable Product Quality. Journal of Marketing vol.64, 2000, P. 66-79. KREPS, David. Course of microeconomics theory. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994. RASMUSEN, Eric. Games and Information An Introduction you the Game Theory. Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992. SPENCE, Michal. Market Signalling: Informational Transfer in Hiring and Related Screening Processes. London, England: Harvard University Press. 1974. STADLER, Male Ins and CASTILHO, David Perez. An Introduction you the Economic of Information. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. STIGLITZ, Joseph E. The Contributions of the Economics of Information you the Twentieth Century Economics. Quaterly Journal of Economics v. 463, 2000, P. 1441-79. For Alexsandro Rebello Bonatto in 09 of December of 2008. alex@